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Abstract 
 
The Prüm network was established to provide mechanisms and the infrastructure to achieve a 
closer cooperation between the EU member states in combating terrorism, organised crime 
and illegal immigration through the cross border exchange of DNA profiles, fingerprints and 
vehicle registration data. While Prüm offers clear benefits for cross-border policing, it 
continues to present challenges of a technical and scientific nature as well as legal, ethical 
and socioeconomic concerns. This article reviews these challenges as well as the existing 
safeguards. It argues that, in order to achieve Prüm benefits and maximise its potential, it is 
important to enhance the necessary dialogue and cooperation between member states so as to 
confront the above concerns and address challenges posed by Prüm through balanced 
measures.  
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Introduction 
 
During the past decades, the EU member states have increased their efforts in the fight 
against terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration. Increasingly, terrorism and other 
serious crime have developed a cross border dimension, which is accentuated by the 
dismantling of internal border controls within the Schengen free movement area and ease of 
travel and communication within the EU and beyond. Recent terrorist attacks in Europe have 
demonstrated that the need for closer transnational cooperation to prevent atrocities and to 
achieve a swift and efficient law enforcement response is paramount. In the wider context of 
transnational cooperation, information exchanges between law enforcement authorities are 
essential in fighting cross border crime and to ensure a high level of security in the EU.   
In order to achieve timely access to accurate and up-to-date data for law enforcement 
authorities, a number of EU instruments and systems have been put in place in recent years, 
supplemented by international and bilateral arrangements. These instruments fall within 
overarching objectives set by the Lisbon Treaty (Art 87 TFEU); specific principles and policy 
frameworks set out in the Hague 2005 and Stockholm 2010 Programmes - including 
availability and mutual recognition; Council’s Information Management Strategy 2009 and 
the related Action Plans; Commission Communications and studies (COM(2010)385) and 
have to be applied with respect for fundamental rights (Art 6 TEU).  
The key instruments for law enforcement information exchange in the EU include: the 
Swedish Framework Decision (Council Framework Decision 2006/960 JHA on simplifying 
the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the 
Member States of the European Union) which covers the exchange of information for the 
purpose of criminal investigations or criminal intelligence operations, with a particular focus 
on access to information; the Prüm Decisions (Council Decision 2008/615/JHA on the 
stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border 
crime and Council Decision 2008/616/JHA on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA 
on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation particularly in combating terrorism and cross-
border crime) which provide for automated exchange of biometric data (DNA profiles and 
fingerprint data) and vehicle registration data for the prevention and investigation of criminal 
offences and maintaining public security; Council Decision 2007/533/JHA on the 
establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS 
II) which provides alerts on persons and objects, and  Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for 
Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), which provides inter alia for the collection, 
storage, processing, analysis, and exchange of information and intelligence.  
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This article focuses on the cross border exchange of bio-information specifically of DNA and 
fingerprints. Given the importance and the nature of information that DNA and fingerprints in 
particular offer for investigations and prosecutions in a domestic level, their cross border 
exchange acquires great relevance as an unparalleled facilitating tool of transnational policing 
cooperation. In Europe, traditional channels of cross border exchange of bio-information 
include individual legal assistance requests which, depending on the provisions of the 
domestic legislation in the respective countries, engage either police or judicial channels. 
Another important mechanism is Interpol through its established central databases of DNA 
and fingerprints. The DNA database is autonomous and does not keep any nominal data 
linking a DNA profile to any individual. The data is provided by its member states which in 
turn use them for comparison. Member states retain the ownership of their profile data and 
control its submission, access by other countries and destruction in accordance with their 
national laws. Where a match is found a message is sent to the countries contributing to the 
match. This message contains the basic case information that was provided and can 
optionally provide the sample codes. Member states then decide if they wish to pursue this 
forensic intelligence link (ENFSI 2016). 
A great disadvantage of the traditional channels of information exchange is that they employ 
time consuming, complex bureaucratic procedures, which are counterproductive in criminal 
investigations (ENFSI 2016). One of the most recent and significant measures to facilitate the 
cross border exchange of bio-information has been the network established in 2005 by the 
Treaty of Prüm (originally signed by the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Kingdom of Spain; the French Republic; the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria). The Prüm network was 
transformed into EU –wide cooperation tool through the Council Decision 2008/615/ JHA 
and Council Decision 2008/616/JHA becoming acquis communaitaire binding on all existing 
and new EU member states. The ultimate goal of the Prüm network is to overcome the 
lengthy mutual legal assistance bureaucratic procedures by establishing a single national 
contact point as an electronic interface for automated information exchange. Traditional 
channels of legal assistance are only activated when search data matches a stored entry 
whereby a hit would lead to a request for further information (Topfer 2011).  
The Prüm network provides for the exchange of DNA profiles (in 15 minutes), fingerprints 
(in 24 hours) and vehicle registration data (in 10 seconds) across all the EU Member States 
which have not opted out of the measures (Home Office 2015). Prüm Decisions may be used 
for the exchange of personal data regarding the prevention of terrorist offences and joint 
operations by police agencies of Member States. While Prüm offers clear benefits for cross-
border policing, it continues to present challenges of a technical and scientific nature as well 
as legal, ethical and socioeconomic concerns. This paper reviews these challenges as well as 
the existing safeguards. It argues that, in the name of benefits that Prüm offers and in order to 
maximise its potential, it is important to enhance the necessary dialogue and cooperation 
between member states so as to confront the above concerns and address challenges posed by 
Prüm through balanced measures.  
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Prüm network of cross border information exchange: a brief overview 
 
The Prüm regime of cross border information exchange is based on three measures: Council 
Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross border cooperation, particularly in 
combating terrorism and cross border crime; Council Decision 2008/616/JHA on the 
implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA and Council Framework Decision 2009/905/JHA 
on accreditation of forensic service providers carrying out laboratory activities. The first two 
measures, referred to as Prüm decisions, have the following main elements: 
 Chapter 2 of the Council Decision 2008/615/JHA and Chapters 2-6 of the Council 
Decision 2008/616/JHA provide for the automated search and comparison of data 
from national data files in the area of DNA, dactyloscopic [fingerprint] data and 
vehicle registration data.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 of the Council Decision 2008/615/JHA deal specifically with 
information exchange for the prevention of offences in the context of major events 
with a cross-border dimension (such as sporting events or European Council 
meetings) and measures to prevent terrorist offences.  
 Chapter 5 of the Council Decision 2008/615/JHA and Chapter 6 of the Council 
Decision 2008/616/JHA provide for other forms of law enforcement cooperation 
including joint operations and mutual assistance in connection with mass gatherings 
disasters and serious accidents. 
 The operational chapters are underpinned by Data Protection rules set out in Chapter 
6 of Council Decision 2008/615/JHA.  
Under the terms of the Prüm decisions, contracting states have reciprocal access to national 
databases containing DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration data and are allowed 
to conduct searches in an automated way through their nominated contact points holding 
authorisation to carry out automated searches (Council Decision 2008/615/JHA - Article 2). 
DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration must be in relation to an identifiable 
individual or to a criminal incident. Prüm operates as a hit/no hit system similar to that used 
by Interpol discussed above. The initial automated search of national databases excludes 
personal data with the exchange of such personal information occurring at a later stage. After 
a hit or a match, countries can obtain the personal and/or case information associated with the 
DNA-profile or fingerprint via existing mutual legal assistance procedures, through police or 
judicial channels. A request for personal data is regulated by the national legislation of the 
requested Member State.  While the reported low volume of transactions through Interpol 
may be attributed to “often poorly defined and cumbersome” processes, as well as 
unpredictable response times, Prüm offers a more efficient process, either wholly (for vehicle 
registration data) or partially (for DNA profiles and fingerprints) automated and subject to 
strict response times which make Prüm a much more useful operational tool for the police 
working on real time investigations (House of Commons 2015).  
To enable the automatic exchange, each country creates a copy of its DNA-database with a 
standardized table structure, which can be accessed by common data exchange and DNA 
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comparison software present in each country (Council Decision 2008/615/JHA). The 
requirement for a copy DNA database allows member states to apply filters that limit the 
scope and category of profiles and data being fed to the Prüm network; for instance a country 
may decide not to upload profiles obtained by a certain category of individuals such as 
victims or volunteers. Prüm decisions do not contain any requirements as to the scope of 
profiles and information to be included in each national database and therefore which profiles 
or data will need be exchanged; whether or not DNA samples should be retained and after 
what amount of time samples, profiles and fingerprints should be deleted from the system.  
It has been questioned whether the Prüm regime sufficiently upholds the principle of 
availability introduced by the Hague Programme 2005 according to which information for 
law enforcement purposes needed by authorities of one Member State are to be made 
available by the authorities of the Member State where the information is stored. According 
to the principle of availability, there should be as few obstacles as possible in the way of an 
official from one Member State accessing information held by another Member State. 
Combined with the principle of mutual recognition which holds that information collected or 
produced by one Member State should be deemed as valid as that collected or produced by 
another, disparate Member States become part of the single entity: the Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice (Jones 2012). It has been argued that under Prüm, data does not become 
constitutive of a common area wherein national sovereignty on data is relaxed; less data will 
be exchanged under Prüm than foreseen under the principle of availability as indirect access 
to data is the norm (Bellanova 2008). 
While the principle of availability is arguably a vision worth pursuing, in practice, at least for 
the time being, it can work only partially. It is impossible to realise its full potential as long as 
there still exist different national, legal and administrative systems, data protection 
legislations and interoperability problems (Jones 2012) It is impossible for the aspirations 
highlighted by the above principles to be achieved without the standardisation of the 
technology and procedure as well as the harmonisation of respective domestic legal 
instruments. Cross border exchange of information raises particular ethical and legal concerns 
as sensitive personal data such as DNA and fingerprints obtained and retained in one country 
leave the jurisdiction and legal protection afforded by the legal framework of that country. 
There is a need to strike the right balance between the public interest in fighting crime which 
requires information exchange and the protection of the rights involved; consequently 
safeguards and limitations are necessary. 
The European Council stressed that the following conditions should be observed in the 
implementation of the principle of availability (Hague Programme 2005):  
 The exchange may only take place in order for legal tasks to be performed;  
 The integrity of the data to be exchanged must be guaranteed;  
 The need to protect sources of information and secure the confidentiality of the data at 
all stages of the exchange, and subsequently;  
 Common standards for access to the data and common technical standards must be 
applied;  
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 Supervision of respect for data protection, and appropriate control prior to and after 
the exchange must be ensured; and  
 Individuals must be protected from abuse of data and have the right to seek correction 
of incorrect data.  
To this end, Prüm sets out a number of data protection safeguards. Article 25(1) of the 
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA requires Member States to guarantee a level of protection at 
least equal to that resulting from the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981 
(Convention 108) and its Additional Protocol of 8 November 2001. Article 25(2) states that a 
Member State may only exchange information if it has passed a data protection evaluation. 
Article 26 concerns purpose limitation. The processing of data by the receiving Member State 
shall be permitted solely for the purposes for which the data have been supplied defined as: 
(a) Establishing whether the compared DNA profiles or dactyloscopic data match; (b) 
Preparing and submitting a police or judicial request for legal assistance in compliance with 
national law if those data match; and (c) Recording within the meaning of Article 30. Data 
supplied must be deleted unless it is required for the purposes set out in points (b) and (c) 
above, which means that profiles, fingerprints and license plate number/VINs cannot be 
stored on the receiving country’s systems. 
Article 28 sets out accuracy, current relevance and storage time of data requirements. This 
includes a requirement to notify a Member State if data supplied is incorrect or should not 
have been supplied. Any incorrect data should be corrected. If the accuracy or inaccuracy of 
data cannot be ascertained, the data are to be flagged. Member States cannot store data for 
longer than the law of the sending Member State permits. Article 29 requires Member States 
to have technical and organisational systems to ensure data is protected and kept securely. 
Article 30 sets out requirements for logging and recording, including what should be 
recorded, who should be authorised to access any data, and time limits for retention of the 
logging requirements. In Article 30(5), the Decision sets out that that the independent data 
protection authorities in each Member State should carry out random checks on the 
lawfulness of supply. Article 31 sets out data subject rights. Data must be supplied 
comprehensibly and without unacceptable delays, on the data processed in respect of his 
person, the origin of the data, the recipient or groups of recipients, the intended purpose of 
the processing and, where required by national law, the legal basis for the processing of data.  
The data protection aspect of Prüm exchanges is not subject to the recent Directive 2016/680 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties and on the free movement of such 
data repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. While a single, coherent data 
protection regime for all EU police and criminal justice measures may be attractive, it is 
difficult to be achieved in practice. The Prüm data protection rules deal specifically with data 
exchange within the scope of Prüm whereas the general rules within the new Data Protection 
Directive establish general principles that govern the exchange of data between and within 
Member States. Arguably it would be difficult to capture specific purpose limitation Prüm 
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requirements in a single set of general data protection rules applicable to all forms of 
cooperation in this field.  
A further important aspect of the Prüm regime concerns the Council Framework Decision 
2009/905/JHA on Accreditation of forensic service providers carrying out laboratory 
activities. The increasing cross border exchange of information and the use of forensic 
evidence from one member state to another highlights the need to establish common 
standards for forensic science providers.  This is particularly important as information 
originated from forensic processes in one Member State may be associated with a level of 
uncertainty in another Member State regarding the way in which an item has been handled, 
what methods have been used and how the results have been interpreted (recital 4-5). The 
Framework Decision requires forensic service providers (for both fingerprints and DNA) to 
be accredited to ISO standard 17025. In compliance with the principle of mutual recognition 
it also requires Member States to treat forensic results from ISO 17025 accredited 
laboratories in Member States as they would a domestic ISO 17025 accredited laboratory 
(Article 1). 
It can be seen that in its entirety the Prüm regime offers a number of safeguards to ensure 
adequate standards and the protection of individual rights related to the cross border 
exchange of personal data. As discussed above, each Member State may identify the data 
(DNA profiles, fingerprints etc.) accessible to other Member States and determine the 
conditions for automated searching (Council Decision 2008/616/JHA para 13 and 18). 
Moreover, automated searches may only be undertaken in individual crimes (Council 
Decision 2008/616/JHA article 3 para 1, article 9 para 1 and article 12 para 1). When a 
Member State joins the Prüm network they may undertake a large scale exchange of data 
against the complete Prüm databases however these safeguards provide data protection in 
relation to an individual’s personal DNA profile, fingerprints and vehicle registration details 
conform requirements of necessity and proportionality (McCartney 2013). Member States 
will never obtain personal data about the DNA profiles/fingerprints that does not match the 
one submitted for the search, with personal data only being provided when a DNA 
profile/fingerprint receives a hit and the provisions of obtaining additional information about 
the purpose of the data are satisfied.  Additionally, the appointed ‘contact points’ that can 
perform searches in the DNA/fingerprints databases of other countries must either be forensic 
services or law enforcement agencies responsible for information exchange (Soleto-Munoz 
and Fiodorova 2014).  
These measures uphold the autonomy of Member States in determining which profiles/data 
are available and any conditions attached. Member States may curtail or advance the data 
provided, as much or as little as they see fit in line with their national law.  As discussed 
further below, while on the one hand this aspect can be viewed as a safeguard, on the other 
hand the significant variation in terms of laws, regulations, and practices within the Prüm 
countries raises specific concerns in the context of cross border policing and personal data 
exchange (Prainsack and Toom 2013). To these challenges and concerns the attention now 
turns. 
8 
 
 
 
 
The ‘rocky path’ to implementation 
 
One of the most prevalent criticisms of Prüm is that its implementation has not progressed 
smoothly or at the pace originally anticipated (Deloitte 2015). The Prüm Decisions should 
have been implemented fully by Member States by August 2011. At the time of writing, eight 
Member States had not yet completely implemented the Prüm Decisions, in particular with 
respect to the automated searches (Council 9823/16). 22 Member States have implemented 
the DNA data exchange, 18 Member States have implemented the fingerprint data category 
and 19 have implemented the vehicle registration data category (Commission 2015; Council 
11001/16). 
Becoming a member of the Prüm network is a complex political and technical process. There 
are multiple, time consuming requirements for complying with provisions on DNA profiles, 
fingerprints and vehicle registration data (Topfer 2011). The adjustment of domestic 
regulatory frameworks is required as well as the establishment of national contact points. The 
setup of central searchable databases connected to the secure European administrator intranet 
S-TESTA, the fulfilment of the minimum data protection requirements, the definition of 
search capacities and the implementation of technical specifications are but a few of the Prüm  
requirements.  After every aspect is in place, several evaluation visits have to be hosted 
before the Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers (JHA) decides, unanimously, that a 
Member State is ready to start operational data exchange (Jones 2012). 
Member states have faced difficulties in adjusting national legal frameworks with the Prüm 
requirements. There have been power struggles between agencies over the denomination of 
the national contact point, difficulties caused by intra-organisational restructuring required 
for transnational cooperation, technical challenges related to incompatibility of 
hardware/software components and connection issues, as well as scarcity in personnel and 
financial resources (Council 14918/10; Topfer 2011). Costs associated with Prüm 
implementation are considerable especially those to be borne by smaller states or those 
countries without established DNA databases (Deloitte 2015). The UK estimated that Prüm 
implementation would cost £13.5 million notwithstanding the UK’s already extensive DNA 
profile, fingerprints and vehicle registration databases (Home Office 2015). Other Member 
States have simply not been able to afford such costs and have continued to delay the 
implementation and operation of Prüm. A number of countries (such as Cyprus, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Malta, and Portugal) were still in the process of setting up their national DNA 
databases several years after the Prüm decisions (Prainsack and Toom 2013). Croatia and 
Italy were still planning how to implement Prüm by 2014 while Luxembourg had not even 
started plans for Prüm implementation by this time (Deloitte 2015). 
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While a Member State may be capable of exchanging information, the operability of the cross 
border exchange system is also dependant on the other Member States readiness to 
participate. As Prüm requires a decentralised network of national databases, over 30 bilateral 
interfaces are required. Most Member States start by connecting with one or two 
neighbouring countries, however as the costs for establishing connections are significant, 
they do not continue investing in creating connections with and extend their Prüm usage to all 
operational Member States (Deloitte 2015). It has been reported that Member States do not 
feel there is a binding obligation to interconnect completely. At the same time, partial 
implementation and Member States’ reluctance affects their counterparts’ abilities to expand 
their connections (Deloitte 2015). There are therefore real risks of relatively one-sided 
cooperation compared with the potential benefits of Prüm. This has been one of the main 
concerns since the early days of Prüm decisions especially for countries with large forensic 
databases such as the UK (McCartney et al 2011).
 
 
Even countries that have fully implemented Prüm have faced difficulties. While volumes of 
data being exchanged under Prüm have been increasing due to the establishment of new 
connections among existing members and with the accession of new Member States to the 
EU, national budgets devoted to international police cooperation have not been increasing. 
Moreover, while direct access is provided by Prüm to Member States’ vehicle data, 
fingerprint and DNA can only be accessed via follow-up procedures based on a hit 
notification, requiring further verification and necessitating additional resources, which have 
not been given adequate attention when considering Prüm expansion (Deloitte 2015). 
The EU has tried to address some of the implementation challenges. A Prüm helpdesk was 
established at Europol in order to support the Member States in relation to the 
implementation and application of the Prüm Council Decision. However, a low use by the 
Member States’ authorities of the Europol helpdesk has been reported, as well as of the 
relevant funding instruments, and the targeted support offered initially by the Mobile 
Competence Team (MCT) (Deloitte 2015). The EU introduced a ‘cost-effectiveness 
principle’ and schemes for smaller countries to recover some of their expenditure to join 
Prüm.  Most of the original time limits for implementation have been extended and initiatives 
to help struggling countries and provide training have been undertaken (Deloitte 2015).   
Even though there is funding and support at the EU level, there seems to be a lack of political 
prioritisation that hinders the implementation of the EU instruments. The current state of 
affairs reveals varying political commitment across the EU, compatibility issues and a 
lacking infrastructure for transnational cooperation. There are varying levels of national 
investment and organisational efficiency which in turn affect the ability to exchange 
information between jurisdictions and undermine the effectiveness of the entire system 
(McCartney et al. 2011). It is expected that it may take another several years before Prüm is 
fully operational, with the implementation likely to be slow and not prioritised by Member 
States. 
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Acceptability, legitimacy and accountability concerns 
At first sight the above appear to be mainly technical and economic issues however they give 
rise to questions of acceptability and legitimacy of the Prüm regime (McCartney et al.2011). 
Prüm obliges all EU member states to establish forensic bio-information databases and to 
guarantee availability of these databases to other EU States. This is done regardless of 
national differences in forensic bio-information collection and retention policy. It has been 
argued that this obligatory exchange which replaces, even in part, any previously voluntary 
cooperation and exchange of information was made without sufficient consideration and 
democratic participation from all member states (Bellanova 2008). Critics have argued that 
the transfer of the Prüm treaty into the EU acquis did not fulfil the requirements of 
democracy and legitimacy (McCartney et al 2011). This is ultimately reflected in the slow 
implementation and lack of prioritisation in several member states.
 
 
Prüm has been described as an example of ‘technological development driving policymaking’ 
that does not give sufficient consideration to human rights protection, the democratic process 
or the trust necessary for the operation of forensic databases and for the cross border 
exchange of bio- information (McCartney et al 2011).
 
Mutual trust is one of the most 
important factors in cross-border information exchange. The effective implementation of data 
exchange provisions has historically faced difficulties generated by a lack of trust between 
authorities within the same or different member states or the perception that data belong to 
the authorities that store them (Bellanova 2008). At present, there continue to exist cases of 
resistance in sharing information between some law enforcement agencies and/or Europol, 
based on fears of losing control over investigations or even leaks in case information 
(Deloitte 2015).  
Differences in the legal and administrative systems of the Member States and data protection 
legislation have hindered Prüm implementation and operation the most (Deloitte 2015). 
While steps toward the necessary technological harmonisation have been taken (Council 
Resolution 2009/C 296/01; ENFSI 2016) differences in data retention criteria in forensic 
databases and data protection provisions between the member states challenge 
standardisation. Human right concerns arise when a state is processing, retaining or sharing 
personal data which probably should not be on their systems or is not lawfully managed 
under the EU data protection regime (Soleto-Munoz and Fiodorova 2014). DNA/fingerprint 
databases in several EU jurisdictions retain the profiles of individuals who are not linked to a 
crime scene stain or were not formally accused of any criminal offense (Santos et al 2013). 
At the same time, following the ruling in S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 
1581, a number of countries (such as the UK, Italy, Poland, Germany), in relation to DNA 
profiles and fingerprint evidence, are deleting an individual’s data if they are found not 
guilty, charges are dropped or where after an arrest and investigation no further evidence is 
found.  
The practical reality substantiates concerns that ‘a virtual EU forensic DNA database 
constructed with different legislative understandings of proportionality, bodily integrity, right 
to individual privacy and presumption of innocence, may present an example of increasing 
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inequalities among EU’s “biological citizens”’ (Prainsack and Toom 2013). At the same time, 
the partial implementation of Prüm by some member states contributes to this inequality as 
the process exposes the citizens of the Member States with larger databases to searches for a 
variety of offences, including minor ones, far more than those from other countries. 
Issues surrounding the retention and exchange of profiles of children and innocent people 
affect the legitimacy and acceptability of Prüm just as much as the argued lack of 
accountability and transparent disclosure of its operations (Prainsack and Toom 2013). The 
Prüm regime is reliant upon both receiving and supplying states checking, and ensuring that 
the cross border data exchanges comply with their respective national laws. Monitoring Prüm 
exchanges is left to national data-protection authorities, which can request a log of both 
automated and non-automated searches and data exchanges. They can then decide upon the 
lawfulness of the data supply. Indeed, all Member States should be proactive in ensuring that 
other states cannot and will not abuse data on their citizens (McCartney et al 2011).  
Many states have constitutions that protect the right of the citizen not to have data held or 
exchanged with other authorities unless expressly authorized. While Prüm contains data 
protection safeguards and measures for individuals to gain information on the data held and 
how they have been processed; to have personal data corrected if inaccurate and claim 
damages in the event of any breaches in data protection it is questionable ‘whether the 
individual whose data has been entered onto EU databases or is subject to EU systems of 
information exchange has in fact any chance of finding out about this, let alone of controlling 
it’ (McCartney et al 2011). It has been questioned whether  Prüm provisions ‘offer the best 
guarantees to empower the control of data subjects on their own very sensitive and precious 
data, especially if data subjects have only an ex-post right of information’ (Bellanova  2008).  
Where personal data move across borders it may put at increased risk the ability of natural 
persons to exercise their data protection rights against the unlawful use or disclosure of those 
data. At the same time, national supervisory authorities may find that they are unable to 
pursue complaints or conduct investigations relating to the activities outside their borders. 
Their efforts to work together in the cross-border context may also be hampered by 
insufficient preventative or remedial powers and inconsistent legal regimes (EU Directive 
2016/680 rec 75). For these reasons there is a need to promote closer cooperation among 
national data protection supervisory authorities to facilitate the exchange information with 
their foreign counterparts and with the Commission in terms of monitoring the consistent 
application of the safeguards specified in the Prüm decisions and Data Protection Directive 
2016. 
The implementation and operation of a decentralised network such as Prüm is hard to achieve 
without some form of centralised decision-making and oversight (Jones 2012). The Prüm 
regime has been criticised in terms of the lack of oversight of the Prüm process regarding 
data protection compliance, “proportionality” and lawfulness of data exchanges at a 
centralised European level (McCartney et al 2011). Prüm has been described as an 
information exchange mechanism characterised by bureaucracy and complexity which leaves 
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open the general question of accountability measures and democratic controls (McCartney et 
al 2011).   
Recently there have been developments of EU level initiatives and systems for a more 
centralised coordination and oversight. The Commission has taken a more proactive role in 
monitoring the level of Prüm implementation and has shown a commitment to examine 
whether Member States meet their legal obligations in the area of information systems, 
whether they make use of existing instruments and if they follow best practices (COM 2016/ 
205). In September 2016, the Commission sent letters of formal notice to Croatia, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal for failing to comply with the Prüm Decisions. These are the first 
infringement procedures initiated for a so-called 'former third pillar instrument' in the field of 
police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (COM 2016/ 670). 
In addition the Council has shown a commitment to stimulating the exchange of forensic data 
via Prüm and improving the quality of forensic data exchanged between all Member States 
under the Prüm Decisions (Council 10128/16). According to Council’s action plan for the 
creation of a European Forensic Science Area 2016, the Working Party on Information 
Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX) is responsible for the EU level oversight of the 
implementation and operation of Prüm. DAPIX handles the improvement of information 
exchange between law enforcement authorities of member states and ensures that data 
exchange is in compliance with current principles and rules on personal data protection. It 
aims to facilitate the exchange of experience in the implementation and ongoing operation of 
communication between the systems of member states, in particular mutual assistance in 
solving the problems that arise not only during implementation, but also in the current work 
(Council 10128/16). It remains to be seen how these tasks will be carried out and whether the 
efficiency of the Prüm system, the transparency of the operational procedures and the level of 
data protection will be improved in the future. 
 
Where next? 
 
The prominence that Prüm Decisions place on cross-border cooperation between Member 
States in order to combat terrorism and cross-border crime, is one of its most significant 
contributions. To combat criminal activities EU Member States must cooperate and share 
information and the Prüm regime is an important step towards the free flowing law 
enforcement information between EU Member States which offers many benefits to curtail 
cross-border crime (McCartney 2013). This is achieved and maintained by law enforcement 
authorities in Member States having access to relevant criminal data through the Prüm 
databases which requires states cooperating and trusting each other’s intelligence, procedures 
and standards of protection of fundamental rights. In this context Prüm has the potential to 
enhance trust between Member States and to facilitate growth through cooperation 
(McCartney et al 2011). Whereas the networks for exchanging DNA profiles and fingerprints 
hold ‘very diverse histories and logics’, the Prüm regime has the potential to offer a 
mechanism for overcoming these differences.  Prüm contributes in establishing an EU 
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‘forensic culture’ which reorders cooperation in relation to policing cross-border crime 
(Prainsack and Toom 2013; Wilson 2016). Prüm Decisions provide the grounds for the 
development (nationally and internationally) of DNA and fingerprint databases, information 
exchange systems and for a greater European integration among Member States. 
Prüm offers a number of benefits that enhance cross border law enforcement cooperation 
(House of Lords 2015). It simplifies current EU intelligence gathering processes and 
encourages greater sharing of information as a routine activity which could assist in the early 
identification of serious offenders and in providing valuable intelligence in relation to counter 
terrorism investigations. The use of Prüm provides efficiency gains in international searching 
enabling law enforcement agencies to establish earlier whether an individual is known in 
another Member State or eliminate a line of enquiry. This leads to early detention and 
operations to prevent loss of life and/or property. Evidence from countries already operating 
Prüm shows that it has the potential to identify patterns of crime or criminal associations 
which are not otherwise apparent (House of Lords 2015). The use of Prüm has the potential 
to contribute to the resolution of cold cases as the increase in flow of information and data 
may lead to an increase in hits with unsolved crime data. At the same time, there is currently 
no other EU mechanism for detecting ‘volume crime’. As such Prüm meets a currently 
suppressed demand. The EU holds several developed DNA/fingerprint databases with the 
potential to search a dataset in excess of 26 million. Full access to these databases greatly 
assists the fight against terrorism and organised crime (House of Lords 2015). 
Member States seem to recognise the crime solving potential of Prüm as an additional 
investigative tool for operational police officers (House of Commons 2015). Time and cost 
effectiveness has been highlighted by a number of Member States, who welcome the need for 
fewer personnel and resources compared with those required to manage the “classic” DNA 
and fingerprint exchange mechanism. Furthermore, the verification of hits remains with the 
requesting Member State and therefore it is more cost and time effective for the requested 
Member State. However the gap created by lack of implementation by some Member States 
allows criminals to continue offending across borders without the ability for law enforcement 
to make use of fast and efficient DNA and fingerprint exchange. When these Member States 
continue using the “classic” route for fingerprint and DNA exchange - INTERPOL, the Prüm 
system is jeopardised as it takes additional resources to facilitate both methods of exchange. 
(Deloitte 2015) 
At the same time, heavy reliance on matches for minor crimes or following false or partial 
hits may divert resources away from preventing crime or conducting thorough investigations 
(Santos et al 2013). The minimum number of matching loci under the terms of the Prüm 
system is still six even though it can be calculated and it has been shown in daily practice that 
six and seven locus matches have a non-negligible chance of being false positive (Home 
Office 2015). The increasing volume of exchanges of DNA profiles means that the chance of 
adventitious or false matches may become even more significant (ENSFI 2016). False 
matches are most likely to occur during the initial ‘bulk exchange’ of DNA and profiles as 
this is the stage at which the largest volume will be compared (House of Commons 2015). 
Any hits need be analysed further by additional DNA-testing before any legal action is 
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undertaken against a matching person (ENFSI 2016). The lack of a targeted approach (or an 
approach which is too narrow) would increase the likelihood of individuals with records on 
DNA and fingerprint databases being suspected after a partial match (Genewatch 2015).  
While the problem of false matches is generally acknowledged, the consequences have not 
always been analysed (McCartney et al 2011). Without a proper consideration, the issue of 
false hits may become even more significant as the Prüm database becomes larger with the 
inclusion of new member states and more commonly used. Recent research in France and the 
Netherlands has found that 26 to 38% of 6 locus hits were true matches, with the result 
increasing to 82 to 94% of 7 locus hits (Home Office 2015). On the other hand, many 
Member States’ DNA profiles are now stored using the new European Standard Set (ESS) of 
loci. As a result, with diminishing percentages of profiles with fewer than 10 loci held, the 
risk of false positives also diminishes (Home Office 2015). It is therefore recommended that 
Member States could adopt higher standards on DNA loci than the minimum of six stipulated 
in the Prüm Decisions. Given the convergence towards a higher set of standards across 
Europe perhaps it is the time for more robust standards and safeguards to be formally 
incorporated in the Prüm Decisions themselves, ensuring a more uniform application across 
all EU Member States.  
 
In this context, a useful approach to be taken into account by member states is the one 
advanced by the UK which officially joined Prüm in May 2016 (Com 2016/809; Council 
5650/16). It addresses a number of Prüm concerns discussed above and aims to achieve a safe 
and fair balance between law enforcement information exchange and human rights 
protection. According to the UK approach, only DNA crime scene profiles with more than 
eight loci will be automatically shared with other Member States on the Prüm exchange so as 
to ensure that the level of adventitious hits is kept within acceptable and manageable levels. 
In follow up requests the UK will only share personal data with other Member States relating 
to a person’s profile held in the UK’s DNA database if 10 or more loci are matched (House 
of Commons 2015). UK’s requirement of 10 loci significantly reduces the likelihood of a 
false match. This would help to avoid innocent individuals becoming criminal suspects or 
being dragged into overseas investigations and remove the risk of personal data being 
unlawfully exchanged between member states. In addition the UK will only allow Member 
States to search the DNA profiles or fingerprints of individuals who have been convicted in 
the UK. In the event of a hit against a person under 18 years old, the UK will only provide 
personal data if the Member State makes a request for the information using a formal Letter 
of Request via mutual legal assistance channels (House of Commons 2015).  
 
The UK will operate a proportionality bar on follow up requests whereby the disclosure of 
personal data could be denied for not sufficiently serious crimes (House of Commons 2015). 
This is deemed important in ensuring an adequate balance between law enforcement and 
individual rights protection and necessary for the management of the volume of exchange. 
The volume of exchange must be managed carefully, as if the workload increases 
significantly, and the resources allocated cannot cope with the demand, the system will not 
work efficiently. Thus it is important that a national search has initially been conducted and 
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an international element to the crime is considered before a Prüm exchange. In addition, the 
evidential value of a crime scene profile obtained from a foreign crime scene must be 
established prior to the release of related demographic data from a matching subject profile 
held on the domestic database. This should include the ‘context’ of DNA samples recovered 
from a crime scene and the type of that sample (House of Commons 2015). 
 
It has been acknowledged by the UK Government that the June 2016 Brexit vote will affect 
its participation in Prüm and that the UK ‘must now reconcile the obligation to implement the 
Prüm package with the decision to withdraw from the European Union’ (House of Commons 
2016 a).  At the time of writing, the UK Government had decided to implement Prüm as part 
of the Home Office’s planned programme of work in place to deliver biometric services and 
capabilities (House of Commons 2016 b). It has been suggested that the Government will 
make some adjustments to its plans to accommodate Prüm, by building additional capability 
within an existing programme of work. The implementation of Prüm will be undertaken ‘as 
soon as possible’, as it has been recognised that the earlier it is implemented the earlier it can 
be used to prevent and detect crime (House of Commons 2016 b). The House of Commons 
European Scrutiny Committee has suggested that the UK’s future withdrawal from the EU 
could give rise to the possibility of a bilateral agreement with the EU concerning Prüm being 
established, similar to those held by the EU with Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and 
Lichtenstein (House of Commons 2016 (b); House of Lords 2016). 
 
Despite the future of the UK in Prüm and indeed in the EU, the safeguards discussed above 
address a number of Prüm concerns and as such they could be beneficial for other member 
states as well. These measures could be given effect at the EU level by imposing additional 
requirements that go beyond those currently specified in the Prüm Decisions. This could be a 
useful step in achieving the harmonisation of legal criteria and safeguards between member 
states. However introducing additional safeguards would require amending the Prüm 
decisions which arguably may not be practicable at this stage where member states are still to 
fully implement the Prüm regime. In fact the Commission has declared that it will not 
consider further developments on the Prüm legal instruments before full implementation by 
all member states (COM (2012) 732). Yet, adequately addressing Prüm problematic areas 
remains a priority.  DAPIX objectives include an analysis of possibilities to reduce the 
number of false positive matches with DNA-profiles as well as improving and optimising 
Prüm follow-up procedures in practice (Council Report 9823/16). 
 
The automated search function of Prüm is a major benefit as it provides immediate feedback 
on requests. This makes it possible to know where information is available. However, proper 
follow-up of DNA and fingerprint hits is essential in order to provide information that is 
actually useful for investigators (Deloitte 2015). There is a heterogeneous picture concerning 
the tools used to follow up Prüm hits with the majority of member states using Interpol. 
There are national preferences regarding the channel to use for the follow-up and 
significantly different approaches seem to exist also within the Member States themselves. 
While numerous stakeholders argue that it is necessary for the continuity of the exchanges 
that the choice of the follow-up channel be open, it must also be noted that SPOC personnel 
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currently have to deal with a complex matrix of national preferences for follow-up channels 
with different Member States. The diversity of follow-up channels can lead to delays in 
information exchange due to duplication of work or risk of coordination mistakes (Deloitte 
2015). 
Problems and delays may be significant where Member States’ legal and procedural regimes 
differentiate between information obtained by police and by judicial authorities (Deloitte 
2015). Depending on the country, Member States may ask for a given type of information 
through police co-operation channels if it is considered a police issue in the destination 
country, while in other countries it may be considered judicial information to be exchanged 
only through a request for mutual legal assistance. While there has to be increased coherence 
in the different approaches used for the choice of channel to ensure consistency and speed up 
the process, binding rules on the choice of channels may not be feasible at this point as a 
number of pre-conditions must be met, which need to be tackled by several actors. A 
potential solution could be to promote an existing channel such as Europol’s SIENA so that it 
becomes de facto the default channel (Deloitte 2015). 
In addition to the above, there are a number of other areas that require further attention if the 
full potential of Prüm is to be achieved. From a technical perspective, systems currently in 
use for comparison would benefit from further development. The system used for palm print 
comparisons for instance, currently does not set out the location within the palm print that a 
latent palm print has matched, making verification a lengthy process (Home Office 2015). 
Technical differences hamper interoperability and must be addressed. Functional 
interoperability can be reached by using agreed definitions of the data exchanged. Technical 
differences (e.g. formats, messaging standards, message exchange technologies) can hamper 
interoperability since they impact on reliability, availability and secure transfer that in turn 
affects the ease with which changes can be implemented (Deloitte 2015).  
Due to the lack of using a uniform procedure for the cross-border automated searching and 
comparison of DNA profiles, methodological irregularities in establishing data exchange 
statistics arise. Following the requirement of Art.21 of Council Decision 2008/616/JHA to 
carry out an evaluation of the application of the data exchange pursuant to Chapter 2 of 
Decision 2008/615/JHA on a regular basis, each Member State compiles statistics on the 
results of automated data exchange which are annually forwarded to the General Secretariat 
of the Council to produce an annual summary overview. In 2016 DAPIX identified a number 
of inconsistencies which call into question the very essence of the statistics that is the 
comparability, readability as well as reliability of the figures (Council Report 9823/16). The 
Prüm statistical model should take account of the above differences and all experts at national 
level need become aware. 
Currently there is no formal mechanism to evaluate Member States’ implementation of Prüm 
or its overall impact on the prevention and investigation of crime. The Prüm statistical 
package does not analyse follow-up work nor is it sufficiently developed to allow conclusions 
to be drawn on the actual impact of Prüm on investigations (Deloitte 2015). A reason for this 
is the complexity of Prüm which is not reflected in the data gathering process. The data 
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currently gathered is on the number of hits and is not comprehensive. Hits need to be verified 
and those which are successfully verified are only an unknown subset of the overall hit count. 
Moreover, once the exchange is completed, it would be very beneficial to look at the number 
of cases in which information obtained following a hit was actually used in criminal 
proceedings. Such data could be used to assess the effectiveness of the Prüm system and its 
impact in the fight against cross border crime. Currently there is no method, other than 
individual analysis of each case, to discover whether a hit was evidential or provided a useful 
investigatory lead or not (Home Office 2015). 
While monitoring the actual outcome of Prüm exchanges in judiciary proceedings is 
challenging, statistics on the actual number of hits that were followed up at all in 
investigations (irrespective of the specific impact on judiciary proceedings) seem in principle 
to be easier to produce. However, as there is no designated channel for Prüm follow-up and 
the choice of channel varies sometimes even within the same Member State, challenges exist 
in producing accurate and useful statistics (Deloitte 2015). These issues need be addressed so 
as to enhance the transparency and accountability of Prüm which will ultimately be reflected 
in the trust necessary for the operation of cross border exchange systems. 
Last but not least, there is need for training and education of all actors involved in the Prüm 
process. Prüm relies on Member States sending fingerprints/DNA/VRD for searching against 
other Member States databases, which will only work effectively if those working in law 
enforcement are aware of this capability (Home Office 2015). There is need to raise the 
awareness of Member States’ national laws that impacts on the Prüm process as well as to 
share best practice so that non-operational Member States can benefit from the experience of 
others (Deloitte 2015). Currently there are gaps in the overall training offered and the quality 
of delivered training is not always sufficient. It has been reported that the awareness of field 
officers of the possibilities for exchanging information is too low because the topic is not 
sufficiently covered at the police academy or covered too theoretically (Deloitte 2015). 
While a variety of different actors are involved in providing training there is currently no 
overarching training strategy at the EU level. Many Member States do not have a training 
strategy identifying needs and rather offer training on an ad hoc basis (Deloitte 2015). 
Strategies need be developed at the EU and national level that define knowledge needs and 
training gaps as well as set out concrete plans on how to cater for these needs. Consideration 
should be given to developing specific training packages that cover all channels and 
instruments that are relevant for information exchange.  There is a need to make full use of 
the existing training offers and for the offers to be enhanced where necessary. To achieve 
this, the Member States, the Commission, DAPIX, and Europol need to contribute and work 
together.  
 
Conclusion 
During the past decades, the EU member states as well as other countries in the world have 
increased their efforts to achieve a closer cooperation in combating terrorism, organised 
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crime and illegal immigration. The Prüm network was established to provide mechanisms 
and the infrastructure to achieve these goals through the cross border exchange of DNA 
profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration data. Prüm network simplifies intelligence 
gathering and increases criminal detections - particularly regarding organised crime and 
terrorism. It provides for efficiency gains in international searching and a more efficient 
response by law enforcement agencies. It increases the resolution of cold cases and provides 
the only cross border mechanism in the EU for detecting volume crime. However Prüm 
continues to present challenges of a technical and scientific nature as well as legal, ethical 
and socioeconomic concerns.   
In order to maximise its potential, it is important to enhance the necessary dialogue and 
cooperation between member states so as to address challenges posed by Prüm through 
balanced measures. Such measures could include additional safeguards as to the type of data 
exchanged and data protection, further technological improvements as well as an increased 
awareness of Prüm capabilities and of national legislation that impacts on the Prüm process 
through training and education. The gap created by the lack of implementation by some 
Member States need be addressed as the duality of data exchange methods jeopardises the 
Prüm system by draining resources. An EU level oversight of Prüm, greater transparency and 
accountability, alongside the harmonisation of national legislations on DNA retention and of 
safeguards on fundamental rights protection, would enhance the trust and dialogue necessary 
for transnational cooperation. 
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